Situations serving as worlds as well as events in linguistic semantics are formulated as strings recording observations over discrete time. This formulation is applied to a linear temporal logic, in line with L. Schubert's distinction between described and characterized situations. The distinction is developed topologically and computationally, and linked to the opposition between truth-conditional and proof-conditional semantics. For a finitary handle on quantification, strings are associated with situations not only on the basis of observation but also through derivation and constraint satisfaction. The constraints specified lead to an implementation simpler than the derivations given.
Introduction
Situations have over the years attracted varying degrees of attention in natural language semantics ( [23, 2, 16] and many others). They have been called on to do the work of worlds for modality, and also the work of events in temporality. An important distinction between these uses can be put in terms introduced by Schubert [24] as that between description and characterization. To say that a formula ϕ describes a situation/world s is to say that ϕ is true in s. To say that ϕ characterizes a situation/event s is to demand in addition that s be (in some sense) about ϕ (so that ϕ is true of s and not just in s). For ϕ to characterize s, ϕ and s must fit tightly, with no part of s extraneous to ϕ. Schubert argues that this tight fit is essential if ϕ because ϕ is to be analyzed in terms of a causal relation between situations s and s that ϕ and ϕ , respectively, characterize. 1 In general, a world is too big to be characterized by a formula, especially a tautology, relative to which every bit of a world is arguably extraneous. A less extreme example from natural language is a formulaφ saying Pat walks from the office to the train station. A situation characterized byφ ought not to include any subsequent train rides. This suggests using a "part of" relation on situations to express the additional requirement characterization imposes on description. For instance, we might reduce the claim that a formula ϕ characterizes a situation s to the description and minimality condition in ( †).
( †) ϕ describes s, and ϕ describes no other situation s such that s s Such a reduction would imply ( ‡).
( ‡) whenever ϕ characterizes s, ϕ characterizes no other situation s such that s s
Although ( ‡) poses no obvious problem for say, an event of Pat walking from the office to the train station, difficulties arise when the modification "from the office to the train station" is dropped: it is widely accepted that an event of Pat walking may have proper parts that count as Pat walking. (Further complications with minimization are discussed, for instance, in Dekker [6] .)
Characterization as the basis of description
Rather than reducing characterization to description, we may derive description from characterization of a -part, as
in (1), for a wide class of formulas ϕ.
ϕ describes s ⇐⇒ (∃s s) ϕ characterizes s
Formulas ϕ for which (1) hold are persistent insofar as an immediate consequence of (1) and the transitivity of is the implication (2).
ϕ describes s and s s implies ϕ describes s
Counter-examples include the formula ϕ saying p throughout every described time, for which it is appropriate to assert ϕ describes s ⇐⇒ ϕ describes every -part of s rather than ϕ describes s ⇐⇒ ϕ describes some -part of s.
That said, we opt for the latter equivalence in what follows, studying formulas for which truth was originally defined relative to worlds. Worlds are -maximal situations, making (2) vacuously true for worlds s . Thus, if we restrict description to worlds, and understand s in the equivalence (1) to range over worlds, we need not worry that p throughout every described time violates (2) . (It can't.) Better yet, we might make do with its variant p throughout every characterized time, which is unproblematic, as (2) fails for "characterize" in place of "describe".
Application to time: strings
The notion of characterization is fleshed out below against formulas from a linear temporal logic under the assumption that next and previous moments are well-defined. In defense of this assumption, Prior writes
The usefulness of systems of this sort does not depend on any serious metaphysical assumption that time is discrete; they are applicable in limited fields of discourse in which we are concerned with what happens in a sequence of discrete states, e.g. in the workings of a digital computer ( [21] , p. 67).
The distance to the previous/next moment is a matter of granularity, which we leave open and refinable by any finite number of observations. Accordingly, the Priorean formula Past p saying that p held sometime in the past may be pictured as the regular language
consisting of strings p n now of length n + 2 (for n ≥ 0), with substring n representing n intervening moments between the observation of p and the present (now). Reversing these strings, we get the language
for the formula Future p saying that in the future p holds. Each of the strings in (3) and (4) is a sequence of snapshots that can be viewed as an event (e.g. Tenny [26] ). In contrast to the situations in McCarthy and Hayes [18] , the snapshots here need not be an exhaustive record of (atomic) propositions true at that moment. This partiality allows the languages in (3) and (4) to be understood as the events characterized by Past p and Future p, respectively. This is made precise in Section 2, where strings are reformulated as schedules and structured topologically by .
From observations to derivations and constraints
An obvious challenge to the finite-state (regular language) approach sketched above is the Priorean formula Future ∀ p saying that p is true every moment after the present, pictured in (5) .
The computational complications posed by (5) and other temporal formulas (both more and less complex than Future ∀ p) motivate a step from strings-as-observations to strings-as-constructions. Very briefly, the disjunctive normal form in a subbasis/basis presentation of topologies makes way for the higher types of proof-theoretic semantics. The progressively longer (finite) strings approximating the infinite string in (5) are derived in Section 3 from incremental replace rules that can be implemented by finite-state transducers. Finite-state constraints that capture sufficient iterated applications of these rules are studied in Section 4, constituting a declarative alternative to the procedural methods of Section 3. We step back in Section 5 and conclude.
Events in linguistic semantics
Before proceeding to the technical developments in Sections 2-5, let us pause for some more motivation. Temporal logic and event semantics have competed since the days of Prior and Reichenbach for the attention of linguists. These approaches can be brought together under the view of situations-as-strings, applied to linear temporal logic below, having been tried out previously against (a) the analysis in Reichenbach [23] of tense and aspect, with event time strung out, and formulas S and R for speech time and reference time such that, for instance, It rained from dawn to dusk is represented by the regular language rain,dawn rain [27] ) of events based on telicity and the difference between temporal for and in modification ( [7] ) (c) Kamp's event structures ( [15] ), which are represented in [12] as projective limits of strings, and (d) so-called anankastic conditionals ( [9] ).
Strings-as-situations are compared to the Event Calculus of van Lambalgen and Hamm [17] in [11] , and extended with branching to cover modal implications of the progressive in [13] .
Schedules and linear temporal logic
It will prove convenient to (i) identify time with the set Z of positive and non-positive integers, 2 reserving 0 to mark out the present, and to (ii) push negation towards the atoms, fixing a set P of propositions with a map · :
Let us refer to a relation s ⊆ Z × P between integers and propositions in P as a P-schedule, the idea being that s(i, p) says p is true at time i. For example, the string p now p, q corresponds to the P-schedule {(−3, p), (1, p) , (1, q) }, for P ⊇ {p, q} with now understood to be at 0. Let us call a finite P-schedule a P-strip (as it can be written as a string in Pow(P ∪ {now}) * ) and write Str P for the set Str P ={s ⊆ Z × P | s has finite cardinality} of P-strips. A P-world is a P-schedule w such that for all p ∈ P and i ∈ Z,
A P-situation is a P-schedule s such that s ⊆ w, for some P-world w. (In other words, a P-situation is a P-schedule s such that for no i, p is it the case that s(i, p) and s(i, p).) We equate the part-of relation with the subset relation ⊆, and drop 2 We relax this identification in Section 5 to consider, for instance, the real line.
the modification P-on schedules, situations, strips and worlds when we can. This section concerns topologies over sets X ⊆ Pow(Z × P) of schedules induced by sets of described schedules from a notion of characterization according to (1) .
Typically (but not necessarily), the schedules in X will be worlds, 3 and a characterized situation will be a strip s, understood as a finite set of observations of any x ∈ X such that s ⊆ x.
Topologies based on finite observations
Applying the notion of characterization to a set A of schedules in place of a formula, let us agree to read "s ∈ A" as A characterizes s, so that under (1), we have
Next, given a set X ⊆ Pow(Z × P) of schedules, we define (i) X A ⊆ X to be the set of schedules in X described by A
to be the family of subsets of X determined by sets A ⊆ Str(X) of finite observations
where A B is defined to be {s ∪ r | s ∈ A and r ∈ B}.
The topological space (X, O(X)) foregrounds the "reality" x ∈ X A ∈ O(X) that is presumably observed, at the expense of the finite observations s ∈ A ⊆ Str(X) that shape O(X). An alternative that downplays the "points" x ∈ X and highlights the observations is to endow Pow(Str(X)) with the structure of a locale, consisting, under the presentation in Vickers [28] , of (i) binary operations X and X given by
for all A, B ⊆ Str(X), and (ii) the set {ŷ | y ⊆ Z × P} of functionsŷ : Pow(Str(X)) → {0, 1} given by a schedule y such that for all A ⊆ Str(X),
A notion halfway between topological space and locale is that of a topological system (X, Pow(Str(X))) with satisfaction relation |= ⊆ X × Pow(Str(X)) defined by
for all x ∈ X and A ⊆ Str(X). From the topological system (X, Pow(Str(X))), Vickers derives the topological space (X, O(X)) by spatialization and the locale ({ŷ | y ⊆ Z × P}, Pow(Str(X))) by localification. For our present purposes, the situation Table 1 Vickers [28] applied to the situation in Schubert [24] .
Vickers Schubert
Topological system (X, Pow(Str(X)))
is summarized in Table 1 . The remainder of this paper is directed at developing the "pointless topology"-perspective of locale theory for the concrete case of a linear temporal logic (extending Priorean tense logic with Kamp's since and until constructs) putting the set Str P of strips in center stage, and consigning the particular choice X of points to the background. That said, we proceed from the point/world-oriented semantics traditionally given to linear temporal logic (under Kripke semantics).
Temporal formulas and characterization
Given a set P • of atomic propositions, let (i) P = P • × {+, −}, and for a ∈ P • , (a, +) = (a, −) and (a, −) = (a, +), and (ii) Φ be the set of temporal formulas ϕ generated from p ∈ P by
Building a Kripke frame around Z, we can interpret each formula ϕ ∈ Φ relative to a function (valuation) v : Z → Pow(P • ) and integer i ∈ Z in the usual way, with
where x v is the P-world
Note that we can construe negation as an extension of · : P → P to Φ along the dual pairs ( , ⊥), (∧, ∨), (Next, Next), (Previous, Previous), (until, release) and (since, initiate) so that e.g.
Also, we can equate Future ϕ with until Next ϕ, and Future ∀ ϕ with ⊥ release Next ϕ, etc.
As |= specifies what P-worlds formulas in Φ describe, the next question is: what about characterized events? For such a notion, a minimal condition of faithfulness to |= is the following. Given a set A ⊆ Pow(Z × P) of schedules, an integer i ∈ Z, and a formula ϕ ∈ Φ, we say A i-portrays ϕ if for every function v :
The aim of this subsection is to define for every pair 
where u(ϕ, n, i) is defined by induction on n ≥ 0 to witness ϕ between i and i + n − 1: u(ϕ, 0, i) = {∅} and
Temporally reversing until to get since, let
where s(ϕ, 0, i) = {∅} and
Turning to release, let us consider first the special case ⊥ release ϕ, noting that [[i, ⊥ release ϕ]] is roughly the limit of u(ϕ, n, i) as n → ∞. More precisely, we put 4 provided X has enough points-e.g. if X contains all P-worlds. By contrast, it is noteworthy that [[i, ϕ] ] is defined independently of the choice X of points.
Schedules from sequences of strips
In general, we can reformulate the sets
as follows. We
(iii) apply projection functions π, π of a pairing function on N to define
Steps (i) and (ii) lift Str P to N → Str P , while step (iii) keeps us from ascending further to N → (N → Str P ) and beyond, by
Currying and pairing
for n ≥ 0. There is little to choose between encoding a P-schedule as
or as n≥0 f (n) for f : N → Str P . For a canonical system of approximations relative to an enumeration P = {p n } n≥0 of P (which may repeat in case P is finite), we let S n , for n ≥ 0, be the set of {p m | m ≤ n}-strips with domain restricted to integers whose absolute value is ≤ n
and define functions r n : S n+1 → S n mapping s ∈ S n+1 to its intersection with {i ∈ Z | |i|
The inverse limit of the projections (r n ) n≥0
is isomorphic to the full set Pow(Z × P) of P-schedules, with (s n ) n≥0 corresponding to n≥0 s n , and conversely, Table 2 Replace rules for ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ.
Replace rules and derivations
An important difference between the strings from the previous section and those considered in model checking (Clarke et al. [4] ) is that negated atomic formulas may appear in the former (since atomic formulas are not listed exhaustively). For applications to natural language semantics, it is convenient to build strings from formulas that can be quite complex. A wide class of examples that has to do with so-called continuous change in the progressive is illustrated by Pat is gaining weight, for which we might let ϕ be the formula ∃x (weigh(Pat,x) ∧ (∃y < x) Previous weigh(Pat,y)) and construct the regular language ϕ + for observations ϕ n of n + 1 moments (for n ≥ 1 
before unwinding it to a language over the alphabet Pow({now, p, q, r}). It turns out that whereas L 1 is regular (over an alphabet with the symbol p, until q added), the language corresponding to
is not. To see this, it is useful to formulate rules of the sort on which a tableau construction for Φ is based. More generally, these rules resemble replace rules in finite-state tool-kits such as that in Beesley and Karttunen [3] .
Replacing Φ-schedules
We shall derive the sets [[i, ϕ] ] incrementally by applying certain rules to the Φ-schedule {(i, ϕ)}. For instance, the top four rule schemas in Table 2 suffice to 
The formal definitions are as follows. Given a string s over the alphabet Pow(Φ) and an integer i ∈ Z, let s i be the Φ-strip defined recursively on s by i = ∅ (where is the empty string) and
Next, given a relation R ⊆ Pow(Φ) + × Pow(Φ) + between strings, and Φ-schedules s and s , we say s R-succeeds s if for some (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ R, there exists i ∈ Z such that
(Hence, we can keep s 1 in s by arranging that s 2 contain s 1 .
5 ) When R is understood, we shall write s 1 s 2 and ss for (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ R and s R-succeeds s, respectively. In the example above, we have (for R given by Table 2 ) 
Before constructing infinite chains of R-successors to analyze temporal formulas built with release or initiate, we need to be careful to restrict applications of the recursive rule schemas ϕ until ψ ϕ ϕ until ψ ϕ since ψ ϕ since ψ ϕ to guarantee the second argument ψ is realized. Accordingly, let R be the set of rules in Table 2 with these schemas deleted, and
put in their place. An i-derivation of ϕ is a function f : N → Str Φ−{⊥} such that f (0) = {(i, ϕ)} and conditions (c1) and (c2) hold for all n ≥ 0.
Condition (c2) ensures for instance, that an i-derivation of
attends infinitely often to ⊥ release p and ⊥ release q alike. Let us write f P for the function λn.
Proposition 4.
For all ϕ ∈ Φ and i ∈ Z,
and for every i-derivation f of ϕ and every n ≥ 0, f P (n) ⊆ f P (n + 1).
To get a grip on the complexity of the sets [[i, ϕ] ], let us, for the sake of definiteness, identify P-strips with strings over the alphabet Pow(P ∪ {now}) that neither begin nor end with the empty set . (For example, we identify {(1, p)} with now p , rather than any of the strings in + now p
above, observe that q may jump over r when replacing strings in (7), 6 and that the q's never outnumber the p's. That is, 0, ϕ] ]. An obvious but important fact about portrayal is that if some set of schedules portrays both ϕ and ψ, then ϕ and ψ are logically equivalent (in that they are true at the same P-worlds); and conversely, if ϕ, ψ are logically equivalent, then they are portrayed by the same sets of schedules. Portrayal is determined completely by truth relative to worlds; characterization (of events) is a finer grained notion that is underdetermined by truth at worlds. No world can distinguish p from p ∨ (p ∧ Next p), but any notion of characterization for event semantics (in linguistics) must discern the difference in temporal extent between p and p ∧ Next p. Tightening the fit between a formula and a situation it characterizes (over that between a formula and a situation it describes) is essential if, according to Schubert [24] , we are to account for causal relations pervasive in natural language.
Digression: derivations as ways of being true
The replace rules above do not preserve truth e.g. ϕ ∨ ψ does not imply ϕ , and are in this sense unsound. But they yield ways of explaining truth that when read right to left (rather than left to right) preserve truth e.g. ϕ implies ϕ ∨ ψ . Moreover, by Propositions 4 and 2(a),
for all functions v : Z → Pow(P • ), i ∈ Z and ϕ ∈ Φ. For this reason, it is tempting to describe an i-derivation f of ϕ as a proof that ϕ is true at i-assuming that is, f can be grounded in the P-world x v implicit in talk of truth at i. The reference here to worlds suggests that an i-derivation is not so much a proof as it is a way of being true. Before putting proofs aside, however, let us not forget our declared interest in something more than truth at a world; over and above what a formula describes, we want to know what it characterizes (without necessarily bringing in worlds/points). Unraveling what a formula characterizes is a process very much like that of (de)constructing a proof, bottoming out in assumptions that fall well short of a world.
Digression: observation versus derivation
Let us call a temporal formula ϕ ∈ Φ finitely observable if [[i, ϕ]] ⊆ Str P for some (equivalently, any) i ∈ Z. Examples include temporal formulas with no occurrence of release or initiate (Proposition 2(b)). These are also finitely derivable by Proposition 3, raising the question: can we sharpen Proposition 3 to
In sum, the formula ⊥ release is finitely observable but not finitely derivable
The inequality above rests on conceptualizing an i-derivation f : N → Str Φ as a computation that has at the nth stage f (n) processed the approximation f P (n) = f (n) ∩ (Z × P). There is a striking similarity here to notions of stage and algorithm investigated by Moschovakis; in particular, readers familiar with Moschovakis [19] might draw the following analogies with Fregean sense (Sinn) and denotation (Bedeutung).
As the mode or manner of presenting denotation (value), sense (computation) can be a very delicate matter, less robust than denotation (value). I would not claim that a definitive account of sense for formulas in Φ necessarily exists, let alone that the notion of derivation above provides such an account. The preceding discussion of ⊥ release brings out a problem with waiting for the end of an i-derivation before "observing" the value under construction. The discussion also points to a possible solution: step up to higher types and form the lambda term λn.∅ in F + ( , i). Type theory construed proof-thoeretically has in recent years been applied fruitfully to interpret (and not only assemble) semantic representations for natural language (e.g. Ranta [22] and Cooper [5] T. Parsons has dubbed "the study of those 'formulas of English' that are treated as atomic formulas in most logical investigations of English" subatomic semantics ([20] , p. ix), hypothesizing that events are the key to its mysteries. Assuming an event can be formulated as a string (or, more precisely a P-strip, for some set P of observations), it is natural to try out automata-theoretic methods (firmly established in model checking as well as various areas of natural language processing such as morphology) before moving on to the more complex type-theoretic machinery of proof-conditional semantics. Insofar as events in subatomic semantics can always be put in the past, the strings that represent them must arguably be finite. An instructive English example exposing the shortcomings in reducing p before q to q after p is (*) Pat stopped the car before it hit the tree.
A postcondition of Pat stopping the car is that car be stationary. The car can be assumed to remain stationary unless some force puts it in motion. As being in motion is a precondition for hitting the tree, we may conclude from (*) that in the absence of any intervening forces, the car did not hit the tree. To formalize such reasoning, it is convenient to pick out certain formulas as inertial, and for each inertial ϕ, build a non-inertial formula fϕ saying intuitively that a force is applied to make ϕ true at the next moment ( [10] ). Assuming the negation of an inertial formula is inertial, we can then equate an inertial ϕ with the conjunction (fϕ release ϕ)∧ Previous (fϕ initiate Next ϕ)
which says not only that ϕ holds, but that it persists forward unless some force is applied against it, and persists backward unless some force was applied for it. 7 We can encode inertial persistence either through the replace rule ϕ fϕ initiate Next ϕ fϕ release ϕ or, avoiding explicit reference to either release or initiate, through constraints
that define regular languages according to a modification (from [14] ) of constructs in Beesley and Karttunen [3] . Precisely what ⇒ means, and how ⇒ can be applied to overcome the non-regularity above are what the next section is all about.
Constraints as languages
In this section, we recast the replace rules from the preceding section as constraints defined through a subsumption relation on languages that compares the information encoded in strings of the same length. 
7 Differentiating fϕ from fϕ allows us to equate fϕ with
asserting that fϕ succeeds in bringing ϕ about at the next moment unless opposed.
Using the semantics for ⇒ and L given below, we can capture now Φ by applying the constraint now * now ⇒∅ (10) precluding multiple occurrences of now to the language * now * asserting that now occurs.
Subsumption and constraints
Given strings s and s over the alphabet Pow(Φ ∪ {now}), we say s subsumes s and write s s if s and s have the same length and s componentwise includes s
For languages L and
These definitions allow us to conflate a string s with the singleton language {s}. As a type with instances s ∈ L, a language L is essentially a disjunction s∈L s of conjunctions s; between strings, more is more e.g. ϕ, ψ ϕ but between languages, less is more e.g. ϕ ϕ + ψ .
A now-anchored string s encodes the schedule sched(s) ⊆ Z × Φ with now taken as time 0 and
For an arbitrary now-anchored string s = α 1 · · · α n with now ∈ a i , we can re-express sched(s) using the notation from Section 3.1 as
where s • is s without now.
To reformulate replace rules from the preceding section in terms of regular languages, we define the constraint L ⇒ L (for any languages L and L ⊆ Pow(Φ ∪ {now}) * ) to be the set of strings s ∈ Pow(Φ ∪ {now}) Table 3 Constraints for ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ.
Previous ϕ ⇒ ϕ (12) ϕ until ψ ⇒ ψ + ϕ ϕ until ψ (13) ϕ since ψ ⇒ ψ + ϕ since ψ ϕ (14) ϕ release ψ ⇒ ϕ, ψ (10), L ⇒ ∅ reduces to the language
The replace rules in Table 2 suggest the constraints in Table 3 , with, for instance, (13) picking out strings α 1 · · · α n such that for all i < n,
To apply the constraints in Table 3 , some definitions are helpful. Let L consist of the strings in L that are -minimal
( [10] ) so that for example,
For C 0 equal to the constraint
where the latter disjunct p until q, p * p until q fails to require that q eventually hold. To plug this loophole, let us replace the until-constraint (13) in Table 3 by
Similarly, we replace the since-constraint (14) in Table 3 by
where
We can also strengthen the Next-constraint (11) to
Next ϕ a ⇒ ϕ (19) and the Previous-constraint (12) to
The variants a ⇒ and b ⇒ of ⇒ build in eventuality conditions, sidestepping complications from compactness arguments (familiar from first-order logic) deriving p ∞ from p + . We pay particular attention next to the formation of infinite strings.
Padding and paths
Given now-anchored strings s and s , we say s weakly subsumes s and write s s when sched(s ) is a subset of sched(s)
We can reduce to and relax the assumption that s and s are now-anchored by defining a function unpad that removes all initial and final empty boxes in a string Stepping from strings up to languages, let us write unpad(L) for the image of L under unpad
and L for L with any number of leading and trailing 's deleted or added
The equivalence
Given a schedule x ⊆ Z × Φ, we can form approximations of x along a set L of now-anchored strings, defining
Of particular interest below are sets L that are similar to the set Stg(x) of now-anchored strings s inducing schedules contained in x
A path is a set L of now-anchored strings that is 
(with quantification similar to acceptance in Büchi automata; e.g. Clarke et al. [4] ).
Approximating [[i, ϕ]]
Let C consist of the constraints from Table 3 with (11)- (14) replaced by (15)- (20) . Henceforth, we assume that Φ is closed also under the binary connectives ul and si, with
For every ϕ ∈ Φ, let C ϕ be the intersection of constraints L 1 ⇒ L 2 in C such that the lefthand side L 1 contains only subformulas of ϕ (suitably modified for until and since)
for B ∈ {∨, ∧, release, initiate, ul, si},
For every ϕ ∈ Φ, subfmla(ϕ) is finite, and so C ϕ is regular. For example, if ϕ is Previous(p) ∧ Next(q), C ϕ is
and apply C ϕ ,
consists of the single strinĝ
To restrict a string s to P now = P ∪ {now}, we form r P (s) by intersection with P now
so that for example, r P (ŝ) = p now q .
Proposition 5.
For every ϕ ∈ Φ constructed from P using ∧ and at most n applications of Next and at most n applications of Previous, Notice that padding now, ϕ in C now (ϕ) is essential for eking out an extensible set from C now (ϕ). Finally, for every ϕ ∈ Φ, we form the set
and L is a path} of schedules given by paths within C now (ϕ). 
(It is crucial here that (11) and (12) are strengthened to (19) and (20) .) For every ϕ ∈ Φ, one can build finite-state machines
with at most one occurrence of q in everyL-string because of -minimization (from apply).
Discussion
Summing (1)). The denotational semantics provided by the constraints in Section 4 admit a simpler (finite-state) implementation than the operational semantics of Section 3.
The focus above on characterizing (as opposed to describing) situations reflects a shift in emphasis from models to formulas. Whereas the choice of a model (in the form of a machine or program) can be taken for granted in model checking, it is often unclear in natural language applications what models to consider. Whatever these models may be, however, do formulas that characterize situations as strings presuppose models where time is discrete? Must we throw out the real line as a model of time? No, no. Situations-as-strings presupposes only that we can make some selection of discrete times-e.g. Z from . Any such selection can be refined indefinitely. Indeed, we can extract through inverse limits relative to projections respecting (a1) and (a2).
(a1) every string is formed from a finite alphabet (i.e. finitely many observations); (a2) time does not advance without change.
More precisely, fix a set Ψ of formulas that includes copies of all real numbers. Keeping (a1) in mind, let Fin(Ψ ) be the set of all finite subsets of Ψ . We build (a2) into a function ρ : Pow(Ψ ) * → Pow(Ψ ) * that reduces a block αα of two α's to one
where r Ψ componentwise intersects strings with Ψ 
includes points σ such that for every finite set Ψ = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r n } ⊆ of reals with r 1 < r 2 < · · · < r n ,
In general, each σ ∈ IL(Ψ ) defines a strict partial order ≺ σ on 
tagging strings with successor chains on which the connectives Previous and Next from LTL depend. As Z is infinite, however, the infinitely many constraints (21)-(23) lead to an infinite alphabet and a non-regular language. Accordingly, we have put ρ aside in Sections 1-4, and made do with χ 0 , called now.
That said, constraints (21) and (22) raise the question: are there formulas in Ψ (or Φ) which can be viewed as atomic in that they never appear in the lefthand side L of constraints L ⇒ L with L / = ∅, or in the lefthand side of replace rules such as those in Table ( 2)? Under Table ( 2), derivations terminate as soon as all boxes in a string contain only propositions in P;
that is, propositions in P form terminal symbols, and formulas in Φ − P non-terminals (so that strings over subsets of P are in normal form). The inertial constraints (8) and (9) mentioned at the end of Section 3, and lexical rules such as dawn + dusk ⇒ + noon + (sandwiching noon between dawn and dusk) run counter to the impression given by Table 2 . It is doubtful that natural language semantics has any use for irreplaceable propositions that are meant only to be observed.
In the remainder of this paper, we shift our attention from the structure of formulas (in Ψ ) over to the structure of strings and languages (over the alphabet Pow(Ψ )).
Factors
Among the strings weakly subsumed by a string s are its factors: strings s such that s = us v for some (possibly null) strings u and v. It is easy to see that L ⇒ L is the set of strings s such that every factor of s that subsumes L also subsumes L L ⇒ L ={s ∈ Pow(Ψ ∪ {now})
where Fac(s) denotes the set of factors of s 
where -max(L )={s ∈ L | not (∃s ∈ L − {s}) s s}.
It follows that
and if L is a path, then
(with ≡ given by according to Section 4.1) and
Moreover, a finite-state machine accepting L can be transformed into one accepting L ∞ .
Parallel composition and context update
Implicit in the terminology "factors" above is a view of concatenation as multiplication. If we work with an alphabet of sets (as symbols), there is another binary operation & on languages that can equally be understood as multiplication. The superposition L&L of languages L and L consists of componentwise unions of strings in L and L of the same length
Whereas concatenation glues languages serially, superposition puts languages in parallel, running a finite-state machine for L in lockstep with a finite-state machine for L to produce a finite-state machine for L&L ( [7] ). Superposition lies behind the subsumption relation in Section 4 inasmuch as it reduces to containment between languages
Recalling that L L reduces to L L , we can make L and L co-occur subject to constraints C in the language
C may be the constraint now 
